Table of Authorities...................... ii
Statement of Jurisdiction...................v
Statement of Issues Presented for Review.....................................1
Statement of the Case......................2
Statement of Facts.........................3
Summary of Argument........................5
I. The district court abused its discretion by not responding to and/or ignoring numerous motions by defendants regarding proper venue, even though defendants have no nexus in New York. ...........................................6
II. The district court abused its discretion by sanctioning defendants - but not plaintiff - and then issuing a default judgment against defendants for incomplete discovery issues..............9
III. The magistrate court abused its discretion by allowing hearsay testimony by plaintiff's former employee William Goodell, who was incorrectly admitted as an expert witness, while plaintiff Julian Robertson himself was not available for direct or cross-examination to verify the facts of the case...........11
IV The district court erred by awarding plaintiff a judgment of $38,129.64, according to 28 USC 1332......16
Certification per Fed. R. App. 32 (a)(5)..18
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
This statement is made pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.1. Defendant Appellant National Liberty Press LLC and Conspiracy Digest LLC are Montana-based corporate entities with no nexus in New York and have no parent corporation, subsidiaries or affiliates that have issued shares to the public
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Barrett v. Joie, 96 Civ.0324,2002 WL 335014 (SDNY Mar. 4, 2002)......................................................11
Metropolitan Opera Association v. Local 100, No. 00 Civ. 3613 (LAP), 2005 WL 1712241, (SDNY July 19, 2005)......................12
Manley v. Engram, 755 F. 2nd 1463 (11th Cir. 1985)..........8
Schneider v. Green, No. 88 CIV. 2931 (MJL), 1990 WL 151142 (SDNY Oct. 01, 1990)..................................................12
Anglo-Iberia Underwriting, Mgmt Co. v. Lodderhouse, 282 F. Sup. 2nd 126, SDNY 2003)............................................13
Carey v. Piphus, 435 US 247 (1978).........................13
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 US 130.................14
Celle v. Filipino Reporter Enters., Inc. 209 F. 3rd 163 (2nd Cir. 2000)......................................................14
Wachs v. Winter, 569 F. Sup 1438 (EDNY 1983)...............15
Wachovia Bank v. Schmidt, 546 US 303, 126 S. Ct. 941, 163 L. Ed. 2nd 797, (2006).................................................8
Tri-State Employment Services, Inc. v. Mountbatten Surety, 295 F, 3rd 256 (2nd, 1996).............................................8
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Cov. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).....................................................10
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.317 323-24 (1986)........10
Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, U.S.Pa.1955, 75 S.Ct. 544, 349 U.S. 29, 99 L.Ed. 789; .................................................7
All States Freight v. Modarelli, C.A.N.J.1952, 196 F.2d 1010 ............................................................7
Van Dusen v. Barrack, U.S.Pa.1964, 84 S.Ct. 805, 376 U.S. 612, 11 L.Ed.2d 945, on remand 236 F.Supp. 645......................7
Pocahontas Supreme Coal Co. v. National Mines Corp., 90 F.R.D. 67, 69 ............................................................8
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945).....................................7
Bicicletas Windsor, S.A., 783 F.Supp. at 786................7
Central Sports Army Club v. Arena Associates,Inc S.D.N.Y.1997, 952 F.Supp. 181...............................8
Robinson v. Overseas Military Sales Corp., 21 F.3d 502, 507 (2d Cir. 1994).......................................................4
Manley v. Engram, 755 F. 2nd 1463 (11th Cir.1985).8
Tri-State Employment Services Inc v. Mountbatten Surety, 295 F, 3rd 256 (2nd 12002)..........................................8
STATUTES AND RULES
28 U.S.C. 1391(a) & (b) ................................6, 8
28 U.S.C. 1332 (b) ....................................5, 16
28 U.S.C. 1406.........................................8
28 U.S.C. 1404 ........................................7
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12 (b) (3)..............2, 3, 6
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 37......................10
NY CPLR 302(a)(3)(ii)....................................2, 4
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF SUBJECT MATTER AND
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1291. On June 17, 2008, the District Court issued a Memorandum and Order granting plaintiff's motion for default judgment against defendants. An inquest hearing in Magistrate Court on August 4, 2009 allowed prejudicial testimony by plaintiff Julian Robertson's former employee William Goodell. On May 11, 2010, the District Court entered judgment against defendants Uri Dowbenko, National Liberty Press LLC and Conspiracy Digest LLC for $38,129.64 in compensatory damages, which was essentially a reward of plaintiff attorneys' fees for filing a meritless lawsuit. A Joint Appeal of defendant Uri Dowbenko et al was timely filed in the clerk's office on July 13, 2010. This appeal is from a final order of Summary Judgment against defendant when District Court imposed costs personally against defendant Uri Dowbenko et al without basis.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED
1. VENUE. Did the district court abuse its discretion by not establishing correct venue as per 28 USC 1406 (a) and (b), as well as denying defendants' multiple and repeated requests for a ruling on venue and change of venue?
2. SANCTIONS. Did the district court abuse its discretion by sanctioning defendants - but not plaintiff - and then issuing a default judgment against defendants for incomplete discovery issues?
3. TESTIMONY. Did the magistrate court abuse its discretion by allowing hearsay testimony by plaintiff's former employee William Goodell, while plaintiff Julian Robertson himself was not available for direct or cross-examination to verify the facts of the case? YES
4. DEFAULT JUDGMENT. Did the district court err by awarding plaintiff a judgment of $38,129.64, when 28 USC 1332 (b) states that the minimum damages must be $75,000?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On the motion of Defendant, the District Court did not dismiss the complaint of Plaintiff-Appellant Julian Robertson for lack of personal jurisdiction under N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302(a)(3)(ii), Rule 12, and improper venue.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Defendant-Appellant Uri Dowbenko is a resident of Montana and defendant corporations National Liberty Press LLC and Conspiracy Digest LLC are limited liability corporations based in Montana.
On July 21 or thereabouts, a call from plaintiff Julian Robertson's attorney Richard Marooney of King & Spalding made us aware that the Al Martin column of May 30, 2005, which was a satire based on plaintiff Julian Robertson's doom-and-gloom remarks in a CNBC interview, had been pirated and distributed on the internet.
Despite the fact that Al Martin Raw.com is a subscriber-only website, which has a paid limited audience, Mr. Marooney asked for a retraction to be published, alleging that the column was defamatory and intimidating defendants by threat of legal action.
The allegedly offending column was timely removed and the retraction, drafted by Mr. Marooney, was immediately published online, as well as a hard copy of the published retraction was sent to Mr. Marooney, according to his demand.
Nevertheless plaintiff Julian Robertson, who has a litigious history of filing frivolous lawsuits (he sued Business Week magazine in 2000 for $1 Billion because it was a "nice round number",) filed yet another frivolous and meritless lawsuit alleging defamation. This filing was clearly a unilateral breach of contract between defendant Uri Dowbenko and plaintiff's attorney.
Dowbenko and defendant Montana corporations then filed separate motions under FRCP 12(b) to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. In support of its motion, pro se defendant Dowbenko asserted that he and the corporations were Montana-based and did not conduct, transact, advertise for business in the state of New York, nor have any real property or bank accounts in New York. Dowbenko et al also sought dismissal, under FRCP 12(b)(3), on the ground of improper venue.
Indeed Plaintiff has to date still not presented any facts sufficient to sustain an exercise of personal jurisdiction under the relevant New York law. Civil Practice Law Rules ("CPLR") 301, 302.
Nevertheless the district court did not grant defendants' Rule 12(b)(2) motions to dismiss plaintiff's complaint. After filing numerous motions for Change of Venue and Expediting Change of Venue, the district court ignored and/or refused to make a ruling. Thus, because of the district court's inaction in granting a dismissal or a transfer of the case to Montana, a waste of judicial resources has ensued from 2005 to present date. The district court should have dismissed this frivolous suit for want of personal jurisdiction and improper venue as per Robinson v. Overseas Military Sales Corp., 21 F.3d 502, 507 (2d Cir. 1994).
On June 17, 2008, the district court ruled against defendants, ordering a default judgment as a form of extreme sanctions and referred the case to a Magistrate Judge on June 19, 2008 for a damage inquest. Following the hearing, the district court awarded plaintiff $38,129.64. Defendants filed appeal timely on July 13, 2010. This appeal is from a final order of Summary Judgment against defendant, when District Court imposed costs personally against defendant Uri Dowbenko et al.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1. The district court abused its discretion by not responding to numerous motions by defendants regarding proper venue, even though defendants have no nexus in New York and plaintiff is not domiciled there, but indeed lives in New Zealand.
2. The district court abused its discretion by sanctioning defendants, but not plaintiff, for incomplete discovery issues and then issuing a default judgment against defendants.
3. The magistrate court abused its discretion by allowing hearsay testimony by a non-expert witness plaintiff's lackey (former employee) William Goodell, while plaintiff Julian Robertson, ignoring the court order to attend, was absent at the inquest hearing and not available for direct or cross-examination to verify the facts of the case.
4. The district court erred by awarding plaintiff a judgment of $38,129.64, as per 28 USC 1332 (b) states that the minimum damages must be $75,000,never asserted in original complaint.
I. The district court abused its discretion by not responding to and/or ignoring numerous motions by defendants regarding proper venue, even though defendants have no nexus in New York.
Despite multiple motions to the district court, there has been, inexplicably, no ruling on venue to date.
This issue of proper venue and jurisdiction has been addressed by defendants from the beginning, as evidenced by Defendant's Comprehensive Rule 12 Motion, filed 9/23/05 (EXHIBIT A)
Also it should be noted that the following motions were filed, which are also,inexplicably, not docketed on PACER. These include:
* Motion to Dismiss for Improper Venue or Transfer Venue to Montana Based on FRCP Rule 12 (b), filed November 11, 2005 (EXHIBIT B)
* Motion to Expedite Court's Decision on Venue, filed January 30, 2006 (EXHIBIT C)
* Motion to Dismiss Default Judgment for Lack of and/or Improper Venue under Title 28 * 1391 (a) & (b) and Title 28 *1406 (a), filed on or about October 11, 2009
During discovery, plaintiff was asked for his address, in order to ascertain the proper venue.
Plaintiff refused to answer that question. A cursory investigation shows that plaintiff Julian Robertson is not registered by the New York City Board of Election as residing in New York City. (EXHIBIT D)
Thus the proper venue for this case has never been SDNY.
In addition, the district court ignored FRCP 1404. Change of venue (a) "For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought.'
All the defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction, improper venue, and insufficiency of process, claiming that no defendant resided in or had substantial contacts with New York.
Prior law includes the common law "forum non conveniens," a doctrine which involves dismissal of a case because the forum chosen by plaintiff is so completely inappropriate and inconvenient that it is better to stop litigation in place and let it start somewhere else. Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, U.S.Pa.1955, 75 S.Ct. 544, 349 U.S. 29, 99 L.Ed. 789; All States Freight v. Modarelli, C.A.N.J.1952, 196 F.2d 1010.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3) specifically permits a party to move to dismiss for before joining issue on any substantive point through the filing of a responsive pleading. The purpose of this section is to prevent waste of time, energy, and money and to protect litigants, witnesses, and public against unnecessary inconvenience and expense. Van Dusen v. Barrack, U.S.Pa.1964, 84 S.Ct. 805, 376 U.S. 612, 11 L.Ed.2d 945, on remand 236 F.Supp. 645.
Also in order to determine if venue is proper in a federal case involving a defendant corporation, the Court must determine if the corporation is subject to personal jurisdiction in the federal district in which the suit has been brought, the court should use the minimum contacts analysis articulated in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945), and its progeny. Bicicletas Windsor, S.A., 783 F.Supp. at 786.
Venue is to be applied to protect the defendant against the plaintiff choosing an unfair or inconvenient place of trial. 28 U.S.C.A. 1391, 1392.
The purpose of venue transfer statute is to prevent waste of time, energy, and money, and to protect litigants, witnesses, and the public against unnecessary inconvenience and expense. Central Sports Army Club v. Arena Associates, Inc., S.D.N.Y.1997, 952 F.Supp. 181.
When plaintiffs file suit in improper forum, district courts are required either to dismiss or transfer to a proper forum.
28 U.S.C.A. 1406
On a motion to dismiss for improper venue, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing that it has chosen the proper venue. Pocahontas Supreme Coal Co. v. National Mines Corp., 90 F.R.D. 67, 69
According to Manley v. Engram, 755 F. 2nd 1463 (11th Cir.1985) residence is indicated by physical presence and intent, yet Plaintiff never presented evidence of being a resident of New York, wherein the proper venue would be SDNY.
Also according to Tri-State Employment Services Inc v. Mountbatten Surety, 295 F, 3rd 256 (2nd 12002), failure to challenge venue is equivalent to a waiver of venue. Defendants have challenged venue from the beginning of this frivolous case
Also 28 U.S.C. 1391(b) is the venue statute applicable to federal question cases. It should be noted that plaintiff failed to establish that venue in the Southern District of New York was proper under any of the three subdivisions of 1391(b). Another case precedent was established by Kerobo v. Southwestern Clean Fuels, Corp., 285 F.3d 531, 2002 Fed.App. 0116P, C.A.6 (Mich.), April 09, 2002 (NO. 00-1201) which also affirms that this case should have been dismissed because of improper venue.
To paraphrase the late Johnny Cochran -- if the venue is amiss, you must dismiss.
Since the district court abused its discretion by not responding to and ignoring numerous motions by defendants regarding proper venue, the judgment should be reversed.
II. The district court abused its discretion by sanctioning defendants - but not plaintiff -- and then issuing a default judgment against defendants for incomplete discovery issues.
In the order of May 11, 2010, the district court states that "Corporate defendants failed to respond to the suit and, due to Dowbenko's deleterious practices during discovery, default judgment was entered against all defendants on June 17, 2008."
It should be noted that during the discovery process, Plaintiff asked the Defendants for a list of subscribers to an internet publication, to which Dowbenko gave all of the information in his possession, custody and control. This included subscribers' email addresses, but not their names, addresses, or credit card numbers since this information is under the control of a third party contractor.
Plaintiff's inability and lack of knowledge in regards to third level internet subscribers is glaringly obvious. Plaintiff's hiring of Kroll as an investigative tool only indicates Kroll's inabilities.
On the other hand, Plaintiff was asked for his address, in order to ascertain the proper venue and Plaintiff refused to answer that question. (EXHIBIT E)
Plaintiff also refused to answer ALL interrogatories and document requests of the defendants, claiming for each and every question proffered by defendants that "they are overbroad, unduly burdensome, and/or not relevant to the claim or defense of any party," the standard boilerplate of legalistic stonewalling.
Nevertheless the district court did not sanction plaintiff for denying defendants their discovery requests. (See Docket Item 31, 6/29/2006, Motion to Compel Disclosure of Discovery, as per Rule 37, "plaintiff has been willfully non-responsive to defendants' interrogatories and request for documents')
Meanwhile Dowbenko repeatedly requested a dismissal on this basis, amongst others, which the district court denied, in its decision of May 11, 2010.
In other words, the district court exhibited a bias on behalf of plaintiff when it ordered extreme sanctions (default judgment) against defendants, while plaintiff also ignored defendants' discovery request.
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (c), unless "pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." The court must view the motion in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, as per Matsushita Elec. Indus. Cov. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986) and Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.317 323-24 (1986)
III. The magistrate court abused its discretion by allowing hearsay testimony by plaintiff's former employee William Goodell, who was incorrectly admitted as an expert witness, while plaintiff Julian Robertson himself was not available for direct or cross-examination to verify the facts of the case.
When the district court submitted the matter to the magistrate judge for a damages inquest, the magistrate judge clearly erred on the side of plaintiff in allowing hearsay testimony at the inquest hearing.
Also "A District Judge may, in his or her discretion, afford a degree of deference to the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation ...," and also, "... the Court reviews the Report and Recommendation only for clear error." Barrett v. Joie, No. 96 Civ. 0324, 2002 WL 335014, (SDNY Mar. 4, 2002)
Plaintiff Julian Robertson was not available for direct or cross-examination, presumably due to his continuing absence from this venue.
Instead the magistrate court allowed hearsay testimony by William Goodell, a former employee of the plaintiff, as well as a recipient of plaintiff's financial largesse. (Plaintiff Julian Robertson made a donation to Goodell's alma mater).
It should be noted that Goodell's testimony was as a layman, with a long term relationship with Robertson, and not as any expert -- accounting, medical or secretary.
Magistrate Ellis did not ask for Goodell's expertise, nor was any given by the Plaintiff. Thus Goodall was not acknowledged as an expert, but he nevertheless gave vague and unverified testimony, without specific details regarding plaintiff Julian Robertson.
Goodell's credibility was in serious question. Goodell was not an expert witness, yet he was allowed to give hearsay testimony, alleging plaintiff's distress at the Al Martin column.
In fact, time and again, Goodell could not give the specific language of specific persons who called in regards to the purported defamation.
Goodell also could not relate how many so-called "friends" or clients of Robertson called, nor how much money or accounts were lost because of the article.
Thus the magistrate judge allowed a biased non-expert witness to appear and, contrary to the Civil Rules of Federal Procedure, deliver water-cooler gossip in court on behalf of his former employer and benefactor.
During the inquest hearing, plaintiff Julian Robertson did not personally appear, despite being ordered by the court to do so. This was also "overlooked" by the Magistrate Judge as well as the fact that there was no testimony relating to Plaintiff's status at the time of the article, the filing of the complaint or during the Magistrate's hearing. Metropolitan Opera Association v. Local 100, No. 00 Civ. 3613 (LAP), 2005 WL 1712241, (SDNY July 19, 2005)
Thus the entire inquest regarding special was in error, since there was no proof of any loss by plaintiff, as in "special damages ... (and) must be shown by allegation and proof". Schneider v. Green, No. 88 CIV. 2931 (MJL), 1990 WL 151142 (SDNY Oct. 01, 1990)
Also Plaintiff failed to evidence accounting before and after Martin's article's appearance. Plaintiff's only witness, the former employee William Goodell, who was the head of plaintiff's Robertson Foundation, could not testify as to how many accounts were lost, nor could he offer minimal knowledge of lost income related to Martin's article.
In other words, the issue of damages was itself not a proper subject for the inquest, since the allegation of damages was never even ruled upon by the district court, as in 'a presumption of actual damage to reputation arises from the statement itself, thereby entitling the plaintiff to recover general damages.' Anglo-Iberia Underwriting, Mgmt Co. v. Lodderhouse, 282 F. Sup. 2nd 126, SDNY 2003).
Plaintiff's allegations of defamation remain just that -- allegations with no proof or evidence. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 US 247 (1978) "on the grounds that those forms of defamation that are actionable per se are virtually certain to cause serious injury to reputation, and that this kind of injury is extremely difficult to prove," as well as "... inability to measure accurately damage to reputation or goodwill..." Metropolitan Opera Association v. Local 100, No. 00 Civ. 3613 (LAP), 2005 WL 1712241, (SDNY July 19, 2005)
Also, because of the asserted status of Plaintiff as this "limited public figure," damages should have been easy to evidence, calculated through loss of income, loss of accounts, etc. Yet, plaintiff's former employee Goodell, plaintiff's only witnesss could not specify which of the Plaintiff's accounts were lost, or the decline in business income.
In fact the one witness who possibly could testify to these aspects of damage, the Plaintiff, did not testify 'may recover damages for mental anguish absent proof of injury to reputation.'
Plaintiff, however, offered no evidence regarding mental anguish, neither objective proof nor mental evidence, which are the minimal criteria according to established by case law.
Also there were no experts testifying to any indications of Plaintiff Julian Robertson's mental status, although defendant Dowbenko requested an independent physical examination to determine various factors including plaintiff's mental competence. (Docket 34).
Of course, one of those factors would indicate Plaintiff's existence at a particular point in time as well as his ability in understanding the complaint itself.
To reiterate, Goodell was not presented as a financial, medical or communications expert witness.
Acting in a pro se capacity, Dowbenko relied on Magistrate Ellis to strike, most, if not all of Goodell's testimony. Yet the magistrate court abused its discretion by not doing so.
Plaintiff's counsel refused to show a living breathing client in this matter. Unavailable, includes out of the hearing jurisdiction, immunity, forgetfulness, inability to communicate and medical conditions that would prevent long distance travel.
The first two conditions seem hollow. The next two prove Martin's point, and the last would have been indicated by Dowbenko's request for a physical examination. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 US 130,"it has merely demonstrated that the article provoked concerned phone calls from investors and caused a certain amount of emotional distress on his part.'
Plaintiff's witness testified that he and the Plaintiff had a long term relationship as, employee, social associates, and publications indicate Plaintiff gifting a room at the Goodell's law school. These could result in questioning the witness's neutrality. (EXHIBIT E)
In addition, the witness's testimony lacks clear facts, normally expected and required in order for a neutral decision maker to make a valid judicial finding, as in "the economic or pecuniary loss 'must flow directly from the injury to reputation caused by the defamation.'" Celle v. Filipino Reporter Enters., Inc. 209 F. 3rd 163 (2nd Cir. 2000)
"However, because Plaintiff has failed to offer evidence of any actual or prospective injury to Plaintiff's reputation, the Court is unable to determine if this amount is 'proportionate to the injury and to the consequences to be averted.'" Referring to Wachs v. Winter, 569 F. Sup 1438 (EDNY 1983)
Even the District Court could not determine actual or prospective injury, therefore how did they reach $38,129.64?
In essence, the district court has awarded plaintiff Julian Robertson $38,129.64 in attorneys' fees for filing a frivolous lawsuit.
The district court erred by awarding plaintiff a judgment of $38,129.64, according to 28 USC 1332 (b).
According to "U.S.C. 1332. Diversity of citizenship; amount in controversy; costs" --
"(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs..." and "(b) Except when express provision therefor is otherwise made in a statute of the United States, where the plaintiff who files the case originally in the Federal courts is finally adjudged to be entitled to recover less than the sum or value of $75,000, computed without regard to any setoff or counterclaim to which the defendant may be adjudged to be entitled, and exclusive of interest and costs, the district court may deny costs to the plaintiff and, in addition, may impose costs on the plaintiff."
Plaintiff has never alleged any damages, financial or otherwise, in his complaint and never proffered any proof or evidence that he suffered any damages either.
Thus the district court's award of $38,129.64 is simply a 'reward' for wasting judicial resources since 2005 and it should be reversed.
In essence this damage award is evidence that the court will allow Plaintiff to continue filing frivolous lawsuits, since "attorney's fees and other expenses are improper sanctions against a party when they are imposed on the court's initiative," as per Marlin v. Moody Nat. Bank, N.A., 533 F. 3d 374, 70 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 1479, C.A.5 (Tex) 2008
The award by the district court constitutes "improper sanctions' and should be reversed.
For the multiple reasons stated above, defendants respectfully ask the appellate court to reverse the district court's order and award plaintiff $- 0 - for filing yet another cynical and frivolous lawsuit.
Post Office Box 43
Pray, Montana 59065
Pro Se Petitioner
Dated: December 1, 2010
TYPE/VOLUME CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 32(A)
I hereby certify that the foregoing brief complies with the typeface requirements of F.R.A.P.32(a) (5) and the typestyle requirements of Rule 32(a)(6). The brief is composed in a 12 point proportional typeface, Times New Roman and complies with the word limit of Rule 32(a)(7)(B)(iii).
Post Office Box 43
Pray, Montana 59065
Pro Se Petitioner
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I declare under penalty of perjury that I have served a copy of the attached brief to plaintiff’s attorney Richard Marooney, King & Spalding, 1185 Avenue of the Americas, New York, New York 10036 by first class mail (since plaintiff Julian Robertson is probably in New Zealand) .
Dated: December 1, 2010
Post Office Box 43
Pray, Montana 59065